加密飞行 Vol.7 | 黄孙权专访：加密没有思想；朋友们啊，我们还在被殖民。

“自由意志占领加密：虚伪的全球化与加州意识形态再殖民。”

Crypto Flight Vol.7 | Interview with Huang Sunquan: Cryptos, Punks, Lacking of Original Thought; Friends, We Are Still Under Colonization.
Abstract: The Crypto Movement Dominated by Liberal Will: The Hypocrisy of Globalization and the Recolonization of the California Ideology.

💡Opening Remarks/卷首语

在这“技术与文化特辑“系列采访中，我们试图追溯加密浪潮的思想脉络变化。从上个世纪40年代开始的冷战，60年代的反文化和越战，到70、80年代的开源运动，黑客文化，自由主义，以及横贯其间以《全球概览》网络为代表的加州意识形态……这些历史关键节点所携带的精神元素，通过一代一代的传承，为后来密码学政治化、90年代密码朋克邮件列表建立及加密货币的探索，打下了或深或浅的精神烙印；来自几十年前的影响，时至今日还在指导最前沿的实践。站在今天，我们往往能听见模糊的回响，却很难切身体会到历史的冲击。通过这次系列采访，我们希望找到那些这项运动的早期参与者们，去听听他们的感受和想法。

In this series of interviews, we aim to trace the evolving ideological threads of the crypto wave. From the Cold War starting in the 1940s, the counterculture and Vietnam War of the 1960s, to the open-source movement, hacker culture, libertarianism of the 1970s and 1980s, and the California ideology represented by networks like The Whole Earth Catalog—these historical juncture points carried spiritual elements that, through generational transmission, laid the ideological groundwork for the later politicization of cryptography, the establishment of the Cypherpunk mailing list in the 1990s, and the exploration of cryptocurrencies. These influences from decades ago continue to guide the practice of the latest generation today. Standing in the present, we often hear faint echoes of this history but struggle to grasp its impact viscerally. Through this series, we hope to connect with early participants of this movement and listen to their reflections.

借第九届网络社会年会在泰国举办之际，我们与主办者中国美术学院，网络社会研究所所长黄孙权教授在曼谷进行了对谈。网络社会研究所（以下简称网研所）长期关注网络通讯技术对社会文化的影响。从2016年开始，网络社会年会每年都会从不同角度与主题切入技术发展与社会变革的关系，观察网络对艺术、社会思潮、全球行动的塑造。年会主题紧跟技术变化与社会现实，过往的参与者不乏包括Vitalik在内的诸多加密技术实践者与研究者。

On the occasion of the 9th Conference of the Network Society in Thailand, we spoke with Professor Huang Sunquan, Director of the Institute of Network Society at the China Academy of Art, in Bangkok. The Institute of Network Society (hereafter "INS") has long focused on the impact of network communication technologies on sociocultural dynamics. Since 2016, the annual conference has explored the relationship between technological development and social transformation through diverse themes, observing how networks shape art, social thought, and global activism. The conference’s themes closely track technological shifts and social realities, with past participants including key figures like Vitalik Buterin and other crypto practitioners and researchers.

网研所近年的许多研究与实践，也围绕着加密技术展开。如结合乡建与区块链技术，发行社交通证“Coop”等。在艺术家与教授的身份之外，黄孙权也是华语圈的互联网先锋，曾推进开源软件在亚洲的汉化，建立亚洲早期的独立网络媒体和博客社群。他的网络参与始终与行动主义紧密相连，也因此构成他自己的技术哲学观——技术应当被社会地改良。

Many of the Institute’s recent work revolves around encryption technologies, such as facilitating rural development with blockchain to issue social tokens like "Coop." Beyond his primary roles as an artist and professor, Huang Sunquan is also a pioneer in the Chinese-speaking internet sphere, having advanced the localization of open-source software in Asia and established early independent online media and blogging communities. His engagement with the internet has always been tied to activism, which in turn shapes his own philosophy of technology: technology must be socially reformed.

基于对加密世界大量的见证与参与，黄孙权亦有许多体悟与反思。这些思考往往回到他亲历的早期网络革命，合作社运动和社会运动的历史当中。

With extensive experience in and reflections on the crypto world, Huang Sunquan often connects these insights to his firsthand involvement in early internet revolutions, cooperative movements, and social activism. Our interview unfolded from this foundation.

Uncommons
Reporter: 935＆7k
Review: Kurt
Edit: 0614

About

黄孙权 Huang Sunquan
台湾大学工学博士，学者、策展人，艺术家。曾于港台多所大学任教，现为中国美术学院教授，跨媒体艺术学院网络社会研究所所长。
Doctor of Engineering, Taiwan University, scholar, curator, artist. He has taught in many universities in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and is currently a professor at the China Academy of Art and director of the Institute of Network Society at the Institute of Transmedia Art.

935
心在20世纪，身在21世纪，思绪在22世纪的加密运动与技术哲学研究者。
Mind in the 20th century, body in the 21st century, mind in the 22nd century crypto movement and philosophy of technology researcher.

7k
技术与媒介研究者。关注货币史与加密货币行业，密码朋克文化。
Technology and media researcher. Focuses on monetary history and the cryptocurrency industry, cypherpunk culture.

技术文化史回顾
Review of Technological-Cultural History

Libertarian与加密技术意识形态
The Relationship Between Libertarianism and Crypto Ideology

935：我们知道您前阵子在旧金山刚完成《文化与技术三部曲》的系列采访，针对信息技术在上个世纪的社会背景进行了挖掘。我们最近在做加密浪潮的系列采访，遵循的也是同样的思路。我们能看到一连串的社会事件，例如冷战，反文化，黑客运动，自由主义等如何潜移默化地塑造后来出现的加密精神气质。 

935：We know you recently completed a series of interviews in San Francisco for your Trilogy on Culture and Technology, delving into the social context of information technology in the last century. Our current series on the crypto wave follows a similar approach. We see how a chain of events—the Cold War, counterculture, hacker movements, libertarianism—subtly shaped the later ethos of cypherpunk.

一些事件对后续的影响关系很清楚，但有些并不是。比如，我们知道libertarian后来深入地渗透到加密意识形态中，但这个过程中到底是什么关键因素导致了这样的渗透结果呢？

Some influences are clear, while others are less so. For example, we know libertarianism deeply permeated crypto ideology, but what key factors drove to this permeation?

黄孙权：关于这项社会运动的思潮脉络变化是个非常重要的问题，我现在也没什么确切的答案，但对这个脉络的思考放在整个西方视角就会比较好理解。

Huang Sunquan: The evolution of this social movement’s ideological lineage is a critical question, and I don’t have definitive answers. But situating this lineage within a broader Western perspective helps clarify it.

简单地概括，Libertarian和加密技术之间的互动关系其实很清楚。加密朋克本身自己并没有意识形态，它没有自己真正的思想，因此被Libertarian的意识形态占领了。

Simply put, Cypherpunks themselves lacked a coherent ideology; they had no genuine intellectual foundation, leaving them vulnerable to ideological capture by libertarianism.

这种占领关系最早可以溯源到冷战时期，在当时，冷战，自由主义，密码学，这三者是共斗关系。冷战时，苏联的卫星上天让美国人非常恐慌，害怕自己落后了。对他们来说，技术一定是要迎头赶上的，只有这样才能够保证美国人的自由。这种对‘自由’的意识是当时Libertarian与美国国防部一致的共识：对Libertarian来说，独立自主和拥有先进的技术是个人自由的关键基础；对美国国防部来说，这同样代表着国家意识形态的独立自由。后来所有互联网跟加密货币在最开始的宣言也都是保护自由，保卫所谓美国式的自由——都来自于他们这一根深蒂固的潜意识。

This takeover traces back to the Cold War era, when the Cold War, libertarianism, and cryptography formed a symbiotic trio. The Soviet Union’s launch of satellites triggered great panic in the U.S. as they feared themselves being technologically behind. For the U.S., catching up technologically was seen as essential to preserving freedom. This notion of "freedom" becomes a shared subconscious between libertarians and the Department of Defense (the DoD): libertarians saw advanced technology as key to individual autonomy, while the DoD linked it to national ideological sovereignty. Later manifestos for the internet and cryptocurrencies echoed this—"protecting freedom," "defending American-style freedom"—all rooted in this deep-seated subconscious.

除了技术层面有一致的潜意识追求， 当时Libertarian所追求的自由状态并不绝对与美国国家权力起冲突。那些搞公社文化的人非常崇尚自由，这种自由是某一种特定的个人主义式的自由。对Libertarian来说，我现在有钱有技术，我可以随时和我朋友聊天，跟我这一群人沟通，我可以摆脱对国家的依赖。这种个人主义式的自由其实不是一个对抗国家的概念，而是一个极大化个体自由的概念。它不一定反国家,反美国,在那个时期它和美国国防部其实是共享一个意识形态。

Beyond shared technological aspirations, libertarians’ pursuit of freedom at the time did not inherently conflict with U.S. state power. Countercultural communes idealized a specific form of individualistic freedom. For libertarians, having wealth and technology meant independence from the state—not necessarily opposing it, but maximizing individual liberty. Their ideology aligned with the DoD’s during that period.

在冷战背景下，密码学与早期的信息技术在当时便成为了一项被Libertarian与政府两者共同寄予厚望的、能够支持美国与个人自由的工具。于是，在当时，美国国防部有80%的研发资金都拿给三所冷战大学MIT，Berkely和Standford，去做早期的相关技术研发。MIT设计的PTP-1成为后面一系列计算机研发的基础，当时每一个最新的电脑都被用在军种，像是海军、陆军和空军。有一本书叫创造冷战大学（Creating the Cold War University），讲的就是这件事。比冷战大学更早的例子是贝尔实验室，也是辅助政府进行研发，不过贝尔实验室开发的东西更加实用主义，有点像现在的大深圳*。

Under the Cold War, cryptography and early information technology became tools jointly championed by libertarians and the government to bolster American and individual freedom. The DoD allocated 80% of its R&D funding to three "Cold War universities"—MIT, Berkeley, and Stanford—for foundational tech development. MIT’s PTP-1 laid the groundwork for subsequent computer advancements, with each new machine deployed in military branches like the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The book Creating the Cold War University documents this. Earlier examples like Bell Labs also supported government R&D, albeit with a more pragmatic focus akin to today’s Shenzhen*.

* 深圳最早发展是从蛇口开始，蛇口的书记本人非常实用主义，是他最早提出“时间就是金钱，效率就是生命”。后来深圳整体产业也比较注重硬件制造和实时根据市场调整（诸如大疆，华为，小米一类的作风）。
The earliest development of Shenzhen started from Shekou, the secretary of Shekou himself was very pragmatic, and it was he who first proposed that "time is money, efficiency is life". Later, the overall industry in Shenzhen also paid more attention to hardware manufacturing and real-time adjustment according to the market (such as the style of DJI, Huawei, Xiaomi).

回到自由主义，密码学，冷战这三者的共斗关系，自由主义变成主导的那个意识形态，国防部想的是我要保持美国的自由，朋克想的是我要保持个人的自由，Libertarian（自由意志主义）想要的是自由意识（我的意志，我的财产我的钱不要受人控制）。所以这三个你可以想象他们为什么可以合流。

Initially, libertarianism, cryptography, and the Cold War were co-conspirators. Among them, libertarianism became the dominant ideology. The DoD sought to preserve American freedom, punks wanted personal freedom, and libertarians demanded freedom of will (my property, my money, free from control). These three streams converged.

因为接收了自由主义的意识形态，被Libertarian take over了，整个加密朋克就是自由意识论的。我不大能说它是liberal或neo-liberal的，但它一定是自由意志论的。现在加密朋克基于密码学去倡导保护个人隐私，当成一种主流和主要目标，但这个目标并不一定是所有人的意志，而是是自由意志主义的。确实，密码学最能够保证的就是你的privacy，但实际上隐私对穷人不重要，隐私是对富人很重要，对公司重要。作为穷人，我已经一无所有了，还有什么重要的？所以密码学的那个privacy看似是在保障所有人，运用好的时候保护社会整体，但现实更多时候是在帮富人做财产转移。

Cypherpunks, having absorbed libertarian ideology, were taken over by it. Thus, the entire Cypherpunk movement became libertarian. I wouldn’t call it liberal or neoliberal—it’s fundamentally libertarian. Today, Cypherpunks advocates privacy via cryptography as a primary goal, but this goal isn’t universal; it’s libertarian. Cryptography ensures privacy, but privacy matters little to the poor—it’s crucial for the wealthy and corporations. If you’re poor and own nothing, what privacy is there to protect? So while cryptography’s privacy claims seem universal, in practice, it often aids wealth transfer for the rich.

有技术但不知道要干吗，然后被来自其他地方的意识形态占领，基本上就是整个科技界在思想和意志上长期以来的常态。中国现在这么强大，但如果你问你的vision是什么，你要出来做什么，其实说不太出来。或许你会说至少我们实现自由了吧，但这个自由是财务的自由，不是精神上的，我听到最多的，就是一种务实的现实主义论调。

Technological capability without ideological direction, leading to capture by external ideologies, is a longstanding norm in tech. China is now powerful, but if asked, "What is your vision? What are you building?" the answers are vague. At best, you hear answers about financial freedom, but not spiritual freedom. What I hear most is a pragmatic, realistic view. 

因此，我从旧金山的访谈找到的那一条线索，就是Libertarian和技术进步论是一种共构。背后是冷战和国防部大学所有的研发实验室，最后杂糅出来的技术把全世界所有的东西相互关联，把这个社会所有的生活关系都变成一种Data，然后就开始采矿。

From my San Francisco interviews, a key thread emerged: libertarianism and technological progressivism are co-constructed. Behind this lies the Cold War, defense-funded universities, R&D labs, and technologies that interlink everything into data—then comes extraction.

现在中国也有很好的技术，也有很多各种商业的和国际上的力量，那我们的技术要有什么样的思想？要推销哪一种文化？我们这种东西跟美国是一样还是不一样？如果中国只是另外一个美国，那我们到底在忙什么?如果我们最后的路子和美国一样，那其实我们也不用有那么多反美的东西。我们华人有没有特殊的对待技术的方式？

China now has advanced tech and global commercial influence. But what ideology drives it? What culture are we promoting? Is China just another America? If our path mirrors the U.S., why oppose it? Do Chinese people have a unique approach to technology?

技术哲学观点：社会运动与技术结合
Philosophy of Technology: Integrating Social Movements and Technology

单一生产率衡量
The Singular Metric of Productivity

935：关于我们该用什么态度，什么方式来对待技术，我最近有一个新启发。资本主义式的生产模式倾向于用金钱价值作为衡量标准，目标往往是最大化收益。为了达到这个目标，要求生产要有最大化效率，一般指生产效率。“生产效率”的多寡是对生产工具、生产技术的一种价值判断，我们用这个标准来判断一个工具、一项技术有多高的生产力。而人的价值其实应该是多样的（实际上，理想的认知是：技术的价值也应该是多样的，只能说技术最主要的价值可能是生产力），但我们现在所做的事，是把人的价值跟技术的价值对齐，把这套对技术生产力的判断也作用在对人的价值判断上，甚至使得人也只剩下这一个价值。所以，如果人的价值只剩下生产率，只剩下人能给GDP带来多少增长，包括技术也只有这个价值的话，那么确实用资本主义的那一套方法来协调资源和生产最有效的，因为资本主义就是最擅长把这部分效率最大化。

935: Regarding how we should approach technology, I’ve recently had a new insight. Capitalist production models prioritize monetary value as the metric, aiming to maximize profit. To achieve this, production must be hyper-efficient—efficiency here typically means productive efficiency. The degree of "productive efficiency" serves as a value judgment for tools and technologies, measuring their "productivity." Human value, however, should be multifaceted (and ideally, so should technology’s value—though its primary role may indeed be productivity). Yet today, we’ve aligned human value with technological value, applying the same productivity metric to judge people, and reducing them to a single dimension. If human worth boils down to productivity—how much one contributes to GDP—and technology is similarly narrowed, then capitalism’s methods for coordinating resources and production are the most effective, as capitalism excels at maximizing this efficiency.

这套价值观好像就是我们近代以来对技术的态度，也是潜意识里对人的态度。

This value system seems to underpin our modern attitude toward technology—and subconsciously, toward people.

7k：是噢，生产力本身就是一个单一价值的词，它意味着各种各样不同类型的、不同地区的生产，都要被统一到一个价值，那就是货币的价值，可以这么认为吗？

7k: Right, "productivity" itself is a singular-value term. Does it imply unifying diverse forms of production across regions into one metric, which is monetary value?

黄孙权：是的。我们把对生产力的评估全部放在市场上评价，因为除了市场化评价以外，你也没办法评估我们的生产率有多少，一旦通过市场评价，就一定会有这样的现象。

Huang Sunquan: Exactly. We evaluate productivity entirely through the market because there’s no other way to quantify it. Once the market evaluation dominates, this phenomenon is inevitable.

自我东方化
Self-Orientalization

黄孙权：对技术进行评价，其实是比较麻烦的，许多的技术观点都有或多或少的欠缺。除了你说的生产力观点，我也不认同那种把东西方技术发展的落差，归结为哲学观差异的观点。这种观点觉得中国、印度的哲学使得东方人对技术的想法不一样，所以导致东方跟西方的技术发展有落差，但我觉得这种解释只能说得通一部分。举一个历史上的例子，我们在明代的时候也讲道器，但这种哲学观，并不妨碍在那时候我们有全球最好的技术。我觉得研究技术哲学的问题并不能只看文化对待技术的态度如何，这并不能解决很多事情。

Huang Sunquan: Evaluating technology is tricky, as many technological perspectives have their shortcomings to varying degrees. Beyond the productivity lens, I also reject explanations that attribute East-West technological gaps to philosophical differences—the idea that Chinese or Indian philosophies inherently shape distinct technological trajectories. But I think this explanation only holds to a certain extent. For example, historically, Ming Dynasty China emphasized Dao and Qi (the Way and artifacts), yet this didn’t hinder its global technological leadership. Studying the philosophy of technology can’t stop at cultural attitudes; this merely essentializes the fluid nature of historical struggles and realities, which doesn’t solve many issues.

现在西方那套发展技术的途径似乎行不通了，打算把中国特殊文化里某一种特定文化当作抵抗的武器，这是肯定行不通的，历史上从来没有发生过这样成功的先例。明代是一个最好的证明，日本的明治维新也是。明治维新时期，难道日本就没有武士道？那为什么它还是可以这么厉害？因为它是开放的，接受新的东西，也没有完全去除掉日本的文化，中国明代也是这样的。所以，虽然文化确实决定了我们看待技术的态度，但不代表文化会决定技术成不成功。技术成不成功完全是一个universal的问题，是个数学问题。

Now that Western technological pathways seem exhausted, some try weaponizing specific elements of Chinese culture as a form of resistance. This won’t work—there has never been a successful precedent for this in history. The Ming Dynasty and Japan’s Meiji Restoration prove this. Did Japan abandon Bushido during Meiji? No. It thrived by embracing new ideas without erasing its culture, just as Ming China did. Therefore, while culture certainly shapes our attitude toward technology, it does not determine whether technology succeeds or not. Technological success is a universal issue; it's a mathematical problem.

许煜写的精彩的书，成为西方人非常喜欢读的东西，因为他觉得中国真的不太一样了，因为我们认为技术是器，然后我们还有一个‘道’。如果借由这种解释，大家一起陶醉在东方的技术认知里，这种看法其实是文化冲突论的变形，是一种东方主义式的哲学化文化的变形。这个东西怎么可能变成我们的答案？你要想看中国的技术是怎么进步的，是要看当代国家（State）的角色怎么主导技术，怎么看待发展与进步，这才是关键，而非依赖传统文化的观点。印度，日本，韩国，台湾，大陆每个地方有不同多元的文化，那难道它们都因此有不同的技术吗？

Yuk Hui’s acclaimed writings, popular in the West, argue China is unique because we see technology as Qi (artifacts) guided by Dao (the Way). Romanticizing "Eastern technological cognition" like this is a repackaged cultural clash theory—a self-orientalizing philosophy. How could this be our answer? To understand how China’s technology has advanced, we need to look at how the contemporary state plays a role in steering technology, and how it views development and progress. That’s the key, not relying on the viewpoint of traditional culture. India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and mainland China all have diverse cultures—do they thus have distinct technologies?

935：能不能这样来理解，一开始这种技术东西分化论只是想为大家提供另外一个看待技术的视角，让大家认识到除了西方那套把技术现代化的做事方式，或许我们还有其他的道路可以选择。本来最理想的状态是，我们一起把认知打开，看到多种参考案例后，对技术的思路会多些可能性。但现在这种渲染东方态度的做法，把东方文化特殊化了，导致一群人从一种唯一解的主流思想，一股脑又全切换成了另外一种唯一解的主流思想？

935: Can we understand it this way? Initially, the theory of technological divergence was meant to offer another perspective on technology, helping everyone realize that, beyond the Western approach of modernizing technology, we might have other paths to choose from. Ideally, the best scenario would be for us to expand our understanding, so that after looking at multiple reference cases, there would be more possibilities in how we approach technology. But now, the way of emphasizing Eastern attitudes has specialized Eastern culture, leading a group of people to switch from one dominant way of thinking, which offered a single solution, to another dominant way of thinking that also presents itself as the one and only answer.

黄孙权：是啊，如果都跑去山上练功，就觉得可以解决生活焦虑，这不是自我东方化吗？

Huang Sunquan: Yes. If everyone retreats to the mountains to "cultivate enlightenment" to solve life’s anxieties, isn’t that self-Orientalization?

技术价值被社会地运用
The Value of Technology to be Socially Applied

黄孙权：我现在对技术的看法是，假设技术确实是一种力量，并且社会变化的力量是可以让技术往所谓进步的方向走的话，那么在美国的Libertarian之所以没有那么让人恶心，是因为有反文化的力量。因为有反文化的力量加入或反对它，所以它就变成了一种遍地开花的思想性的东西。但大多时候，当新技术到中国来的时候，我们的社会并没有产生一种力量来抵制、试用，或是把这个技术推向我们想要的地方。我们缺乏这种文化力量，以至于我们的技术就变成一种非常单一的实用主义的、赚钱式的东西。我觉得这个原因才是关键。其实美国跟我们是同样的技术，可是因为他们有这种社会变革的力量在，例如学运、反越战等等，我们因为没有才会这样。

Huang Sunquan: My current view is that : If technology is a force, and social change can steer it toward "progress," then American libertarianism isn’t wholly repulsive because countercultural forces counterbalance it. These forces—protests, critiques—turn it into a pluralistic ideology. But when new technologies arrive in China, our society lacks such forces to resist, test, or redirect them. Without this cultural power, technology here becomes purely pragmatic and profit-driven. The U.S. has the same tech, but social movements—anti-war protests, student activism—shape its trajectory. We lack this.

台湾因为有社会力量的参与，技术和社会的磨合结果会跟大陆不太一样。我们是站在总统府前面喊总统下台的那一代人，我自己也参加许多的工人运动，社区改造的计划，所以我们完全知道技术要做什么。那时候我们会那么兴奋去搞Indymedia或Blog，是因为我们觉得，以前我们要发文章有多困难，要通过主流媒体才能说话。现在自己每天都可以发，每天都可以写东西骂一遍。就是因为有这些东西在，所以会使得社会变革变得很不一样。同样一个技术，我们可以把这个技术拿过来，变成为草根，为社会说话的技术。

In Taiwan, social forces mediate technology differently. My generation protested in front of the Presidential Office, demanding the president’s resignation. I joined labor movements and community reforms—we knew exactly what to do with technology. We eagerly adopted Indymedia and blogs because, previously, speaking out required mainstream media. Suddenly, we could post daily, and criticize freely. This transformed social change. The same technology became a grassroots tool.

台湾有这样一波一波的运动，譬如说性别运动。举个简单的例子，我在念研究生的时候，我们女同学超凶的，只要我们讲话犯一点点错就会被羞辱。在台大的时候，男生宿舍经常会放A片，然后台大女生也在宿舍做了一个A片活动，说为什么男生可以看片但女生就不行。所以就在宿舍放A片，批评A片都是为男性服务，没有为女性服务。她们还搞了一场霸占男厕的运动，就是让所有台大女上去上男孩子的厕所，因为她们觉得，女生使用厕所的时间比较长，但是为什么空间是一样大，这不公平。所以她们就鼓励所有人去霸占男生厕所。这样一波一波的运动搞出来，后来台湾所有的新的公共建筑里的厕所都规定，女生厕所的空间要是男生厕所的两倍以上。这是运动的成果。

That's a powerful example of social movements shaping public policies. In Taiwan, these waves of movements, like gender movements, have played a significant role in creating awareness and driving change. The example of female students at NTU fighting for gender equality through actions like the A** movie event or the "Occupy men's bathroom" campaign shows how grassroots activism can bring attention to unfair practices and challenge societal norms. The outcome, where female restroom space became larger than men's in public buildings, is a direct result of collective effort and the persistence of these movements. It also reflects how such movements, even if initially viewed as controversial or rebellious, can lead to tangible policy changes that address gender inequality.

就是这些东西不停地转，台湾才能变成那个样子。所以我关注的是这种社会变革的力量，不是那种形而上的传统文化，那个离我们有点远。不过社会变革的力量一定会立足于文化传统，社会变革一定有自己的文化基调，但不是那些老子庄子道家的东西。

It's indeed these continuous shifts that allowed Taiwan to become what it is today. So what I focus on is the power of social change, not the abstract traditional culture, which feels a bit distant from us. However, the power of social change must be grounded in cultural traditions, and social change certainly has its own cultural tone, but it’s not about things like Laozi, Zhuangzi, or Taoism.

我关注的这种技术现实和文化并没有离得太远，只是我不太喜欢那种所有东西都要从道家、墨家开始讲起的说法，我觉得这不起作用。我最关心的是社会变革，每个地区的社会变革一定是不一样的，印度有印度的，日本有日本的，台湾有台湾的，大陆有大陆各个地方的，因为南北差异很大。这才是我最最关切的点吧。

What I focus on is that the intersection of technology, reality, and culture isn't too far apart. I just don't like the approach where everything has to start with Daoism or Mohism; I think that doesn't work. What matters most to me is social change. The social changes in each region are bound to be different—India has its own, Japan has its own, Taiwan has its own, and Mainland China has its own variations, especially considering the huge differences between the north and south. So I think what we need to focus on is the impact of these changes—that's what I care about the most.

再举一个社会力量改良技术的例子。Uber入驻台湾的时候，台湾有几千台计程车开到到总统府广前前去抗议Uber。后来就强迫Uber的价钱要和当地过去的市场价格同价，要收税，所有开车的人都要经过职业培训——这些都是来自工会的压力。现在在台湾，你可以打Uber,也可以打各种计程车，另外所有的Uber雇员也都是享受同样水平的保障的，所以不用担心会出现大平台欺压的情况；德州的Green Taxi存在也是因为工会的力量在对抗Uber。所以我说没有经过社会变革的力量，技术是不会变更好的。当技术有社会力量制衡时，它就会变成一个非常“好”的技术，这种社会变革的力量一般都是非常传统的，工会的，社区的，local的, 有最低工资的保障基本的职业训练。没有这些力量，技术就会是殖民主义的，会来到一个地方然后就杀掉一切。

Here’s another example of social forces improving technology. When Uber first entered Taiwan, thousands of taxi drivers drove their cars to the Presidential Office to protest Uber. Eventually, they forced Uber to align its prices with the local market rates, pay taxes, and ensure that all drivers went through professional training—these were all pressures from labor unions. Now, in Taiwan, you can take Uber or any other local taxi, and Uber drivers enjoy the same level of protection, so there's no fear of exploitation by big platforms. The existence of Green Taxi in Texas is also because of the labor unions fighting against Uber.

So, I believe that without the power of social change, technology will not improve. When technology has social forces to balance it, it becomes a "better" technology. These social forces are often very traditional—unions, communities, and local forces—offering protections like minimum wages and basic vocational training. Without these forces, technology will become colonial; it will enter a place and destroy everything.

失去文化背景的技术觉醒
The technological awakening without a cultural context

935：我们提到一项新来的技术，要跟社会的力量进行磨合，进行本土化过程之后，它才能服务于社会。用您之前的文章里说过的话：“技术里蕴含的社会价值才会被社会地使用”。但最近这些年科技圈对个人数据主权、电子主权的强烈觉醒，背后似乎并没有特别大的文化运动背景。我感到好奇，为什么这次觉醒是在一个没有文化运动的背景之下出现呢？还是说这个觉醒是假的？

935: We mentioned that new technologies must negotiate with social forces to localize and serve society. Or, as you wrote: "The social values embedded in technology are then socially applied." Yet recent awakenings around data sovereignty and digital rights lack major cultural movements. Is this awakening genuine or illusory?

黄孙权：这其实是Libertarian的觉醒。

Huang Sunquan: It’s a libertarian awakening.

935：我也有类似的感受。Web3倡导的东西(至少目前)并不真正原生自生活中大多数人直接的觉醒，而是有一部分人把他们自己的需求说成了所有人的需求。

935: I agree. Web3’s advocacy (so far) doesn’t stem from grassroots awakening but a minority framing their needs as universal.

黄孙权：是的，其实他们说的东西并不是真的你们这一代人真正所面临的问题。不过他们出来做一做事情也有好处，因为现在我们的社会力量内陷了。

Huang Sunquan: Right. Their rhetoric doesn’t address your generation’s real struggles. Still, their efforts are useful—our social forces are stagnant.

台湾的Open Source运动、艺立协，还有唐凤都是在后学运时代出来的东西，韩国第一个公民新闻OhMyNews也是和卢武铉的上台，韩国的工运传统有关。所以，你可以看到每个地方衍生出的新的媒介艺术，其实都跟他们当时的社会需要有关。可麻烦的是，到了2000年后，所有东西都在脸书和推特这样的大平台上面，这个自然规律被洗掉了。台湾后来的社会运动也不像之前20年那么激烈了。台湾现在就只有两个敌人，一个并不是真的但是名义上是敌人——大陆，另外一个是国民党。社会运动可讨论的变革变得非常狭隘，所以这里面不会有更大的社会力量。因为任何事情只要一谈到大陆在，其他的事情马上就不重要了；对大陆来说也是这样，任何事情只要一讲到美国在，其他事情就都靠后。这使得我们所有内部的力量就好像内陷了，出不去了。从这种程度来说，我觉得Web3或Blockchain，或者说在外面的Digital nomad可能会有一些力量。这些人可以出来干点事情还是有意思的，不要以Libertarian非常个人主义式的方法去干就好。如果这个东西最终是出去解决自己的财富自由，那就没有意义了。

Taiwan’s open-source movement, ETBlue, and Audrey Tang emerged post-activism. Korea’s OhMyNews is tied to Roh Moo-hyun’s rise and labor traditions. Post-2000, platforms like Facebook and Twitter erased this organic dynamic. Taiwan’s movements have waned, narrowed to two "enemies": mainland China (nominally) and the KMT. Similarly, mainland discourse fixates on the U.S., stifling internal change. In this context, Web3, blockchain, or digital nomads might spark new forces—if they avoid libertarian individualism. If it’s just about personal wealth, it’s meaningless.

当代加州意识形态
Contemporary California Ideology

重现殖民
Reenacting Colonialism

935：我一直觉得最近这几年，加密圈有几个变化让我觉得是对的方向，但我不确定他们是不是真心地在往这些方向去变化。其中一个方向是越来越多地强调非西方视角的重要性，挖掘借鉴第三世界的文明、非主流的东西。这是这几年在思想或指导精神上的一个转变。但我也有点不确定，这些变化背后的动机是不是单纯呢？他们最早是加州意识形态，现在他们开始看向全球了，这是真的心胸和思路开阔了，还是跟WTO式的全球化一样，是加州形态的继续全球殖民？

935: I’ve noticed a few shifts in the crypto space in recent years that seem positive, but I’m unsure if they’re genuine. For instance, there’s growing emphasis on non-Western perspectives, drawing from Third World cultures and marginalized ideas—a shift in guiding philosophy. But I question the motives: Is this a genuine expansion of vision and mindset, or just California ideology expanding its colonial reach, like WTO-style globalization?

黄孙权：你提的那个问题可以这样来想：美国的东南亚是墨西哥，欧洲的东南亚是西班牙的Ibiza，现在Crypto也是在重现这种路线。美国和中国加密货币以及web3的东南亚就是清迈，这种路线在历史上不断出现，我一点都不意外，这是必然路线。就好像那些Digital nomad一样，21世纪的新嬉皮。以前的嬉皮士会做剧场，会做音乐，还有点文化，现在这群Geek版的digital nomad什么都不会，特别无聊，这些宅男带来的东西都非常惨不忍睹。我以前是个Party goer,参加过许多的informal party, 每周都去。我听说那时候的嬉皮也很蠢也很痴迷东方主义，但至少他们的文化热忱还在。当这些都变成Geek来搞的时候，就变得非常无聊。特别是华语社区更无聊，每次所有人过去就只会说牛逼牛逼很棒，甚至都没有别的词汇来形容。

Huang Sunquan: Your question reflects a historical pattern. America’s "Southeast Asia" is Mexico; Europe’s is Spain’s Ibiza. Now, crypto replicates this: for U.S. and Chinese crypto/Web3 communities, it’s Chiang Mai. This isn’t new—it’s inevitable, like 21st-century digital nomads as neo-hippies. But unlike old hippies who can made theater and music, today’s geeky nomads contribute nothing culturally. They’re painfully dull. Back in the day, hippies were naive and Orientalist too, but at least they had passion. Now, with geeks in charge, it’s lifeless—especially in Chinese-speaking circles, where everyone just chants “牛逼牛逼很棒” (“amazing, awesome”) without deeper critique.

虚伪的Diversity
Hypocritic ‘Diversity’

去看向第三世界是一种虚伪的Diversity。我前些天去听了Vitalik在ETHsea的Panel,说到为什么东南亚对以太坊重要，我看了回答快笑死。他说，第一个原因是东南亚使用者越来越多，好几百万了；第二个原因说这样可以增加我们的Diversity。我都想骂他。许多来这里办活动的人，年薪非常高，跑到这个地方来做一些Public space，搞一些有的没有的活动。他们谈Diversity，谈多元性别，但是Lower income class完全在视野之外。说是 Diversity，就是跟你肤色不一样，性别认同不一样，但我和你是在同一阶级，以至于我们可以一起坐在这。这些搞活动的人，对LGBT, 对新移民、新难民的态度可能比穷人要好很多。

This turn toward the Third World is hypocritical “diversity.” The other day, I went to hear Vitalik speak at the ETHsea panel, and when he talked about why Southeast Asia is important for Ethereum, I almost died laughing when I heard his answer. He said the first reason is that the number of users in Southeast Asia is growing—there are millions now. The second reason is that it increases our diversity. I nearly laughed. Many of the people who come here to organize events have very high salaries, and they come to this place to create some public spaces and do meaningless activities. They talk about diversity, about gender equality, but the lower-income class is completely invisible to them. They talk about diversity, meaning differences in skin color or gender identity, but when I sit with you, we’re in the same class, which is why we can sit here together. These people organizing the events likely have a better attitude toward LGBT, new immigrants, and refugees than they do toward the poor.

从比较大的政治结构来说，加州意识形态和Libertarian就是最后让川普获胜的最大原因。Libertarian在推广的过程中，让贫富差距变大了，但这些人会关心的都是被政治正确要挟的正确类别：种族肤色、性别认同、不同政治倾向。无产阶级的人，没有工作的人，从来不在他们的视野中，于是底层人们越来越郁闷，没有任何人帮他们说话。所以这次美国选举，60%多的亚裔，70%多的拉丁裔跟黑人都投川普，这已经不是少数族群和白人的矛盾，是底层与上层的矛盾。

Politically, California ideology and libertarianism paved Trump’s victory. Libertarianism widened wealth gaps, yet their advocates focus on politically correct categories: race, gender, and politics. The working class, those without jobs, are never in their sights. As a result, the lower class grows increasingly frustrated, with no one speaking for them. In the last U.S. election, over 60% of Asian Americans, 70% of Latinos, and Black voters backed Trump. This is no longer a conflict between minority groups and white people; it’s a conflict between the lower and upper classes.

早期非商业版Web2的消亡
The demise of unrealistic Web2

Indymedia的建设
The Rise of Indymedia

935：我们知道您最早是从保护乡土建筑出发走到艺术设计，最后再转向网络的，可以跟我们讲讲这中间的转变过程吗？

935: We know that you initially started with the protection of rural architecture, then moved into art and design, and eventually shifted towards the internet. Could you share how this transition unfolded?

黄孙权：我是读建筑出身，最早是自己做事务所。后来，台湾反市政府推土机运动开始的时候，我发起几百个设计专业者、上千民众公开反对政府，那时候才认识到学建筑根本没有用，因为建筑完全就是为了资本服务的。所以我就把公司关掉，再也不搞建筑了，下定决心干点别的事。我在想用一种方式，建筑也好，媒介也好，能够说一些大家应该关心但可能还不知道的事。

Huang Sunquan: I studied architecture and initially ran my own firm. During Taiwan’s anti-bulldozer movement against city hall, I mobilized hundreds of designers and thousands of citizens to oppose government plans. That’s when I realized architecture served capital, not people. I shut my firm, vowing to do something meaningful. I wanted to use architecture or media to spotlight overlooked issues.

当时我们搞学运的一批人去搞小剧场，搞音乐节，搞女性主义——使得台湾在1994年的时候就有女性影展，女性戏剧节这些东西。但是当时的主流媒体不会报导我们，所以我们就觉得，那不如我们来写我们自己，我们写我们自己的故事总可以吧？所以就搞了《破报》，搞了20年，台湾有很多年轻人都是看《破报》长大的。当时崔健出了一张新专辑，连唐凤也来《破报》匿名写乐评。

Back then, activists like us organized small theaters, music festivals, and feminist events—leading to Taiwan’s first women’s film festival and theater festival in 1994. Mainstream media ignored us, so we created Pots Weekly, a DIY newspaper that ran for 20 years. Many Taiwanese youth grew up reading it. When Cui Jian released a new album, even Tang Feng came to write anonymous music reviews for us.

后来接触到网络，主要是在2000年左右，因为那时候blog系统开始进到台湾了。那时候的开源软件不兼容双位元检索*，这样会导致我们的网站没办法检索中文。所以我们就整天和他们吵，去跟他们吵要加入双音节字符的检索系统。这样之后，WordPress和其他几个流行的开源软件才开始汉化。

My internet involvement began around 2000 with the arrival of blogging systems. Early open-source software couldn’t handle double-byte characters (used in Chinese), making Chinese text unsearchable. We fought to integrate DBCS (Double Byte Character Set) support, which eventually led to localized versions of WordPress and other tools.

* Double Byte Caracter Set，中文等语系字符为双位元，即两个字节，英文语系字符一般为一个字节。
Double Byte Caracter Set, Chinese and other language characters are double bits, that is, two bytes, English language characters are generally one byte.

比这个更早的网络参与，是1999年的Indymedia。当时Indymedia在全球有120个城市参与，我们在台北也弄了一个中心。解决了检索问题后，我们是汉语界第一个做Indymedia的。在2000年左右，在Indymedia上没有任何审查，可以写文章、传图片、声音和影像等。Indymedia在西雅图的总网站有一个RSS技术*,可以把全球120个分城市的内容都汇集到总网站。所有人都集中在那个上面，力量非常非常得大，在当时Indymedia的影响力可以媲美主流媒介的。像是当时亚马逊对媒体有一个全球网页排行，Indymedia的排名非常靠近路透社，法新社和CNN这样大的国际主流大新闻媒体。它的功能很像现在的Web2,可以读，写，上传。所以，如果真的要讲正本清源的话，其实脸书，推特并不是最早的Web2, Indymedia时期就已经有这些功能了。

Even earlier than this, my involvement with the internet was through Indymedia in 1999. At that time, Indymedia had 120 cities participating globally, and we set up a center in Taipei. After solving the search issue, we became the first Chinese-language group to run Indymedia. Around 2000, there was no censorship on Indymedia—you could write articles, and upload pictures, sounds, and videos. Indymedia’s central website in Seattle had an RSS* system, which aggregated content from all 120 participating cities worldwide. All the content was gathered on that central site, and it was extremely powerful. At the time, the influence of Indymedia could rival that of mainstream media. For example, Amazon’s global website ranking for news outlets placed Indymedia very close to Reuters, AFP, and CNN, major international news outlets. Its functionality was very similar to what we see in Web 2.0 today—you could read, write, and upload content. So, if we’re talking about the origins of Web 2.0, Facebook and Twitter weren’t the first—those functions were already available in the Indymedia era.

* RSS：信息聚合技术，Really Simple Syndication。

人民的媒体失去话语权的开始
The Loss of Grassroots Media Power

935：为什么在当时像是Indymedia这样的草根媒体的影响力能够媲美主流官方媒体，现在我们的媒体影响力却被主流垄断了？

935: Why did grassroots media like Indymedia once rival mainstream outlets, while today’s media is monopolized?

黄孙权：这里面涉及了几个阶段的转变。最早是所有人都在Indymedia上面写东西，传东西。因为不做审查，所有东西都能在上面发表。Indymedia会做一个推荐机制，由一些编辑投票把觉得好的东西往首页前面推荐。这些编辑其实是一个集体的合作组织，使用者也可以把内容往前往上去推，只是使用者的分值权重会稍微小一些。最后在Indymedia首页前面的都是编辑觉得很好的或很重要的新闻，但往下滑到很后面也可以看到一些例如类似法西斯右翼的言论——所以当时就有非常民主的推荐机制。

Huang Sunquan: This involves several stages of transformation. Initially, everyone was writing and sharing things on Indymedia. Since there was no censorship, anything could be published on the platform. Indymedia had a recommendation mechanism where editors would vote on what they thought were the best posts to feature on the homepage. These editors were part of a collective collaborative organization, and users could also push content to the front, though their voting power was slightly lower. Eventually, the homepage featured what the editors considered the best or most important news, but if you scrolled down, you might find some content, such as far-right fascist views—so there was a very democratic recommendation system in place at the time.

后来时间久后，有些比较有个人影响力和粉丝号召力的写手，发现与其在Indymedia平台这边发，他们自己也可以搭建一个Blog，在自己的Blog写。这个时候就开始兴起一批个人Blog。这种形式的个人Blog某种上程度来说开始失掉了最早大家一起做平台的那份合力。以前在Indymedia的时候，大家有一种集体抗争的努力，是所有人集结的发声；转到Blog写后，变成了只有作者个人与听众的关系。这种感受是不一样的。

Over time, some influential writers with personal followings realized that instead of posting on the Indymedia platform, they could build their own blogs and write there. This led to the rise of personal blogs. In a sense, this shift began to erode the collective effort that originally existed on platforms like Indymedia. When everyone was on Indymedia, there was a sense of collective resistance, a unified voice. However when individuals moved to their own blogs, it became a one-on-one relationship between the writer and the audience. This felt different.

不过这个时候也还不算完全变质。大部分人搭建个人Blog还是会依托在几个主要的服务器上。两岸三地都有一些带头的服务器，例如在大陆是Blog.cn。这些大服务器们会牵头组织一些活动，例如当时的第一届华文Blog大赛。那时候方兴东整天在我们旁边跟着干这干那，我们当时都没怎么注意他，后来才发现他变成“博客之父”。上一届MIT Media Lab的主任也会在圈子里一起做事，因为当时亚洲都需要解决软件上使用双位语言共同的困境，所以亚洲的部落格圈，像是台湾，香港，大陆，韩国，日本，基本上都混在一起。因为部落格的事情，我们当时在台湾开会，在香港开会，也在大陆开会。从某种程度上，我觉得2000年到2003年的这些时间搞不好是两岸三地最亲密的时刻。

However, this change wasn’t fully corrupting yet. Most people still rely on major servers to host their personal blogs. There were leading servers in the three regions, such as Bblog.cn in China. These large servers organized events, such as the first Chinese-language Blog competition. At the time, Fang Xingdong was always around doing this and that, and we didn’t pay much attention to him until later when he became known as the "Father of Blogs." Even the former director of MIT Media Lab participated in the community because, at that time, Asia needed to solve the shared problem of using double-byte languages in software. So, the blog community in Asia, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan, was largely interconnected. We had meetings in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, and to some extent, the years 2000-2003 might have been the most intimate moment for the three regions.

所以说在Blog时期，个人和组织的交流，组织和组织的交流还是会有一些情分在。真正的转变在2003年之后，一些商业系统开始进入了。像是中国时报有自己的服务器，联合报有自己的服务器，台湾的无名小站也有自己的服务器。但因为我们的服务器（twblog,net）很旧，速度慢，大家就纷纷搬到商业平台上去。同时，商业平台的宣传力度更大，他们很快就变成热门。最早时候Blog还没有考虑收益的事情，但是Influencer的概念在那个时候就有了，有些商业平台会付费找Influencer到他们平台写。服务器也需要有钱维持，于是开始出现要考虑收益的事情。

During the blog era, communication between individuals and organizations, and between organizations, still had some emotional ties. The real transformation came after 2003, when commercial systems started to enter. For example, the China Times had its own server, the United Daily News had its own server, and Taiwan’s Wretch had its own server. However since our server (twblog.net) was old and slow, people started moving to commercial platforms. At the same time, these commercial platforms had a much larger promotional reach, and they quickly became popular. Initially, blogs weren’t focused on profitability, but the concept of influencers started to emerge around this time. Some commercial platforms would pay influencers to write on their platform. Servers also needed money to maintain operations, so this was when the question of profitability started to appear.

7K：这是不是资本主义收编的开始？因为大家开始想要有收益。

7K: Is this the beginning of capitalism co-opting things? Because people started thinking about profit.

黄孙权: 是的。把服务器搬到商业平台后，商业公司要考虑服务器变现的问题，整个Blog空间内逐渐加入了一些商业考量。比如加了很多广告——这使得你自己的Blog空间不再是你能控制的，广告是平台的，你没法去除掉广告。

Huang Sunquan: Yes. Commercial platforms monetized through ads, which users couldn’t remove. Your blog was no longer yours.

7K：不过好像这种商业化考虑的加入是不是其实也符合常理？毕竟它确实带来了更大的体量，提供更快的平台和更好的服务。

7K: But didn’t commercialization bring scale and better services?

转变过程中为什么会发生失控？ 
Why Did the Transition Spiral Out of Control?

935：我有一个疑惑。从最早具备Web2功能但同时拥有集体精神的Indymedia平台, 中间转成个人Blog，到最后商业平台入驻——我理解是一个从非商业版的Web2逐渐变成了商业版Web2的过程。在这种转变过程中，我们好像逐渐失去了对自己内容的控制权，并一步一步走到今天大家都觉得不喜欢的垄断版Web2的局面。造成这个局面的原因，是不是我们在过程中的商业模式选错了？

935: I have a question. From the earliest Indymedia platform, which had Web2 functionality but also embodied a collective spirit, it gradually shifted to personal blogs, and finally commercial platforms took over. I understand this as a process of Web2 evolving from a non-commercial to a commercial version. During this transition, it seems that we gradually lost control over our own content and moved step by step towards the monopolized version of Web2 that people dislike today. Is the reason for this situation that we made the wrong commercial model choices along the way?

比如，我知道在上个世纪90年代，当商业物联网还处在早期时，我们曾经就互联网的盈利模式有过两种方案:一种是Micropayment, 另一种就是我们今天最熟悉的广告模式。Micropayment是对你网络上所有浏览过的东西都进行电子货币付费，这个电子货币就是今天所有加密货币的前身，它的好处是平台端和政府无法将消费记录与个人信息联系起来。不过后来的互联网选择了后一种模式，也即插广告的方式，虽然所有东西免费，但我们好像也逐渐因为这种方式逐渐失去了我们对内容还有对自己隐私的控制权。您觉得今天我们这样的局面是因为当初的商业模式选择出了问题吗？

For example, I know that in the 1990s, when the commercial Internet of Things was still in its early stages, we had two proposed profit models for the Internet: one was Micropayments, and the other was the advertising model we are most familiar with today. Micropayment was about paying electronic currency for everything you accessed on the internet, which was essentially the precursor to today’s cryptocurrencies. Its advantage was that the platform and the government couldn’t link consumption records to personal information. However, the internet later chose the advertising model, where everything is "free," but it seems that with this model, we gradually lost control over both our content and our privacy.

黄孙权：我觉得这个事情最后的选择跟我们的媒体惯性有关。比如说我们看电视，我们习惯了看电视不用付任何钱，这就会让大部分人习惯这种收听模式。互联网的开始也跟看电视听广播一样，如果你要一开始就付费，最后可能只会搞得没有人会用它。并且最早的时候，大家对于网上支付的工具并不熟悉，上手会有门槛。不过，现在很难推翻回去想象如果当时选择了另外一种历史途径，现在会怎么样。

Huang Sunquan: The final choice is related to our media habits. For example, we’re used to watching television without paying any money, and this makes most people accustomed to that type of consumption model. The internet started out in a similar way, much like watching TV or listening to the radio. If you had to pay right from the beginning, it likely would have resulted in no one using it. Additionally, at the beginning, people weren’t familiar with online payment tools, so there was a learning curve. However, now it’s difficult to go back and imagine what might have happened if we had chosen a different path back then.

935: 如果换一条思路来想这个商业化的问题，可不可以说，其实问题不在于选择哪种途径变现，问题可能出在变现这件事情上？

935: If we think about this commercialization issue from a different perspective, could we say that the problem isn't about choosing which method to monetize, but rather the issue might lie in the very act of monetization itself?

黄孙权：可能是的。创造和做事情的动机变了。90年代Open source刚开始做的时候完全没有想变现问题，那时候只想着：TMD这个世界已经够糟了，我怎么让别人听到我的声音？根本没有人在考虑钱。到2002年开始搞各种部落格平台的时候也还是这样。台湾有很多烂东西，香港有很多烂东西，大陆有很多烂东西，我们怎么让别人听到。

Huang Sunquan: Perhaps so. The motivation behind the creation and doing things has changed. In the 90s, when open-source was just beginning, there was no thought about monetization; people were just thinking, "This world is bad enough, how can I make others hear my voice?" Money wasn't even a consideration. When blog platforms started emerging around 2002, it was still the same. Taiwan had many poor things, Hong Kong had many poor things, and Mainland China had many poor things—how could we make others hear about them?

1999年到2001年是Indymedia高峰期，2001年到2003年是Blog兴起，后期有一些商业平台进来，但这些都还不算大问题。一直到2004年脸书进来，2006年推特进来，这些才是真的终结一切的东西。脸书之后没有人愿意再自己去辛苦搭建一个服务器，运营一个服务器。因为一方面还是有一点点技术门槛在，再者，那个时候即使你自己再去搭，你也达不到人家那么大的体量了，Network effect出来了。

From 1999 to 2001, Indymedia was at its peak, followed by the rise of blogs from 2001 to 2003. Commercial platforms started coming in, but those weren’t the main issue. It wasn't until Facebook came around in 2004 and Twitter in 2006 that things truly changed. After Facebook, no one wanted to go through the trouble of setting up a server and running it themselves anymore. On one hand, there was still some technical barrier, and on the other hand, even if you set up your own server, you couldn't match the scale of these platforms—the network effect had taken over.

✨ Tip

受文章篇幅所限，对黄孙权老师的访谈被拆为上下两部分。本文系上篇，若对下篇感兴趣，欢迎订阅我们。

Limited by the length of the article, the interview with Mr. Huang Sunquan was divided into two parts. This article is the A-side, if you are interested in the next one, please subscribe.

Uncommons
Reporter: 935＆7k
Review: Kurt
Edit: 0614

👇文中图片来源
www.ucpress.edu/books/creating-the-cold-war-university/hardcover
web.archive.org/web/20070113082706/http://pots.tw/
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indymedia

Who we are 👇

Uncommons
区块链世界内一隅公共空间，一群公共物品建设者，在此碰撞加密人文思想。其前身为 GreenPill 中文社区。
Twitter: x.com/Un__commons
Newsletter: blog.uncommons.cc/
Join us: t.me/theuncommons